




















My endeavor in this paper is to examine the ways in which exactly the general structure of perception is modified in the case of the reception of theatre performances. First, perception in general is examined and it is argued that a basic characteristic of perception is that it is sometimes interdependent with action. After the analysis of perception in general, I turn to the special case of the perception of a theatre performance (or, theatre-perception, for short) and examine the role of the perception of the possibility of action in the case of watching a performance. I try to point out that theatre-perception cannot be sufficiently analyzed without taking into consideration the action-oriented character of perception. If we perceive a gun on stage we perceive it as the possibility of an action, that is, as affording certain actions. 




Before analyzing theatre-perception, some general remarks are needed about perception in general. Theatre-perception can be examined only in comparison with the general characteristics of perception outside the theatre. What I would like to emphasize in this analysis is the connection between perception and action. 
According to the classical view, perception is independent from action; action has no constitutive influence on perception.​[2]​ According to this classical picture of perception, perception leads to beliefs, which in turn may or may not result in actions.​[3]​ The connection between perception and action is unidirectional: what action an agent is inclined to perform (at time t) does not have any substantial, constitutive influence on her perceptual experience (at time t).
	The advocates of the classical view would, of course, agree that the action I perform at t1 does influence my perceptual experience at t2, if t2 follows t1. For example, the action of turning my head at t1 does influence my perceptual experience in the next moment. What the advocates of the classical view deny is that there is any constitutive influence of the action one is inclined to perform at t1 on one's perceptual experience at the same time. 
The classical view of perception has been criticized for a long time; it has been argued that the connection between perception and action is not unidirectional. What action an agent is inclined to perform (at time t) does have substantial, constitutive influence on her perceptual experience (at time t).​[4]​ This last sentence, however, can mean many things. In this section, I will argue that one's perceptual experience sometimes (but not always) depends counterfactually on the action one is inclined to perform. 
Perceptual experiences of this kind I will call action-oriented perceptual experiences. If a perceptual experience is not action oriented, that is, if it does not depend counterfactually on the action one is inclined to perform, then I call it detached perceptual experience. My claim is that some (or, arguably, most) of our perceptual experiences are action-oriented. 
In the net section, I would like to give a short outline of an account of perception that takes into consideration the rich connection between perception and action. Then I turn to the relation between perception and action in the case of theatre-perception. 
	It has to be emphasized that sometimes we do perceive the world in a detached way. Sometimes perception and action are indeed independent from each other. It would be a mistake though to infer from this that they are always independent: that perception is always detached. On the other hand, I do not want to claim that the theory of detached perception has to be discarded and completely replaced by another theory that takes into consideration the mutual interdependence between perception and action. 




I define action-oriented perception as seeing the possibility of action in the stimulus: the agent perceives the stimulus as affording a certain action. It is important to emphasize that seeing the possibility of an action does not necessarily mean that the agent in fact acts – it would be true only for reflexes. More frequently, the agent only perceives the possibility of action; the action itself is not performed.
The agent might recognize different potential actions in the same object under different circumstances. I attach different possibilities of action to a newspaper, for example, when there is a fly in my room I want to get rid of and when I want to know the election results.​[5]​ As we have seen, in the case of humans, the action involved in the definition of action-oriented perception is not necessarily an action in fact performed. Furthermore, it is not necessarily motor action, either. For example, when I solve a mathematical problem, I may recognize the abstract action of addition in the “+” sign.
Action-oriented perception connects perception and action directly, without the mediation of abstract categories and inferences based on these categories. This, however, does not imply a behaviorist account of perception and action, whereby perception causes action, since, again, in the case of action-oriented perception an agent may see the possibility of an action even if she does not perform that action. 
When I see the possibility of an action in a stimulus it is not the case that I first categorize the stimulus and then from the fact that the things in this category can lead to a certain action infer that I can (or could) perform the action. If I see the possibility of eating in the stimulus of an apple, this does not mean that I first subsume this stimulus under the category of apple, and then, since apple is edible, infer that this stimulus affords the action of eating. The abstract category of apple is not needed at all for recognizing the possibility of eating in the stimulus of an apple. When one is very hungry, one sees the world as containing two kinds of entity: those that afford the possibility of eating and those that do not. Whether these entities are apples, books, or laptops does not matter; these distinctions play a role only on a far higher level of cognitive processes. 
In action-oriented perception the possible action the agent might perform organizes what she sees: she picks out those features of the visual field that are relevant for the successful completion of the action she is inclined to perform. The other features are irrelevant. In other words, the connection between perception and action is not unidirectional: perception may lead to action, but the readiness to perform a certain action also influences what and how we perceive the world. 
Action-oriented perception is more basic from an evolutionary and developmental point of view. Some animals and young children probably have only action-oriented perceptual abilities, and detached perception appears at a relatively late stage of both evolution and child development.​[6]​ 
	More importantly, the appearance of detached perception did not make action-oriented perception obsolete. We still use these early and simple ways of perceiving the world; furthermore, arguably, we use them most of the time and far more frequently than our detached perceptual capacities. When I am running on the street to catch my bus, it is very unlikely that I perceive the lamppost in my way in a detached way. I do not recognize it as a lamppost first, and then perhaps make inferences whether it influences my momentary purpose of catching the bus, and if I decide that it does, I might act on this information: I might try to avoid bumping into it. 
	Most of the time we perceive the world in an action-oriented way. When I am running to catch the bus, I see the street as containing to kinds of entities: ones affording bumping into them (people, phone boxes, lampposts, cars, trees) and ones not affording bumping into them, but allowing me to run towards the bus stop. When I sense the stimulus of the lamppost, I directly recognize the possibility of the action it affords without contemplating what concept may apply to it. I see it as a threat: as something I may bump into, and I do not classify it as a lamppost, and then infer that I may bump into it. 
This, however, does not mean that on another occasion I cannot see the lamppost in a detached way, when, for example, I sit on a bench in front of it without any particular need to perform any action. 
To sum up, these two notions of perception are not exclusive. It is not the case that we either have only action-oriented perception or only detached perception. We are capable of both: we may see the world as affording a certain action, but we may see the world in a detached way: without seeing the possibility of any action at all. The question, however, is how these two perceptual capacities are related in the case of theatre-perception. 

III. Perception in the theatre

After these remarks on perception in general I turn to the special case of theatre-perception and examine what is the role of the perception of the possibility of action in seeing a performance. I will try to point out that theatre-perception cannot be sufficiently analyzed without taking into consideration the action-oriented character of perception. 
The prima facie intuition would be that theatre-perception is detached, since there is no action we are inclined to perform while sitting in the theatre. In normal cases we are not disposed to perform any action during the performance. This is what is so unique about the reception of theatre performances: no matter what happens on stage, we do not move. It would be a mistake, though, to infer from this that theatre-perception must be detached. If we perceive a gun on stage we do perceive it as affording certain actions. 
There is a significant difference, however, between how action characterizes our perception in the theatre and in everyday perception. While in everyday perception we perceive object as affording actions for us, in the case of theatre-perception we perceive the object as affording certain actions for another agent (that is, for one of the characters on stage). 
To take an example, I turn to a scene from Hamlet. When in the last act the queen picks up a cup and toasts with it. We know that the cup contains poisoned wine, which is meant for Hamlet, but Gertrude does not know that it is poisoned. The question is what the person watching this scene in the theatre perceives. Is the cup affording any action for us? Are we worrying for our life? Or, alternatively, do we perceive this sequence in a detached way, not recognizing any action the cup might afford for the characters? I think neither of these is the case. We do see what action the cup affords, namely killing someone. However, we do not see the dagger affording this action for us, but for one of the fictive characters on stage: for Gertrude. 
An even clearer and simpler example is provided by one of the all time favorite puppet show scenes, where in we see a puppet who does not notice another puppet approaching with a weapon of sorts (a frying pan) from behind. The children in the audience react to this situation very vigorously: they shout at the first puppet trying to warn him of the danger. 
Thus, we see the space of the performance as affording a certain action for one of the characters on stage. What affords the action, however, is very often not a gun or a dagger or a frying pan. More frequently, what we see is not a motor action afforded by an object, but a more sophisticated, sometimes verbal action, afforded by a person. An example might be useful again. 
In Bertold Brecht’s Three Penny Opera, Mack is in prison and he does not see any ways of getting out, when Lucy, the daughter of the police captain, enters. In this case what the audience recognizes is that Lucy means hope for Mack and he must convince her that it would be a good idea for her to set him free, in spite of the fact that earlier he had dumped her several times. Again, if I sit in the audience, watching this performance, there is no action I would be inclined to perform in connection with Lucy. Nor do I see Lucy in a detached way, ignoring how her advent might influence Mack’s future. If I engage with Mack, then my perceptual experience depends counterfactually on the very complex action Mack is inclined to perform with Lucy; I see her as a potential facilitator of Mack’s action of getting out of the prison. To put it differently, I see Lucy as affording a very complex action, though not for me: for Mack. 
These examples suggest that theatre-perception is somewhere between detached and action-oriented perception. It is more detached than action-oriented perception, since it is not our life that is at stake, but only the life of a fictive character on stage. On the other hand, it is more action-oriented than detached perception, since we do see the space of the performance as affording certain actions. Not for us, however, but for someone else.




The phenomenon I described in the previous section is closely related to one of the oldest philosophical questions about the reception of theatre performances, namely, that of identification.​[7]​ Murray Smith summarizes this phenomenon as follows: 

[…] the illusion [is] that I (the spectator) am a character in the story world, faced with the dilemmas and experiences of [one of the characters]; or, more cautiously, that I am brought to imagine ‘from the inside’ the character’s experience. In more common parlance, I may be said to emphasize with the character […].​[8]​ 

As this quote shows, identification is usually interpreted as 'imagining from the inside'. The standard view of identification with a character in the theatre (or in a painting or film) is that this process is a version of ‘imagining from the inside’. Kendall Walton expresses this very idea: 

Of course we identify with […] fictional characters. My not very surprising suggestion is that this […] involves imagining oneself in the shoes of the person identified with. (Walton 1990. p. 255.)

Gregory Currie coins the term ‘secondary imagining’ (to be contrasted with primary imagining, which constructs the fictional world of a work of art) to refer to this phenomenon: 

It is when we are able, in imagination, to feel as the character feels that fictions of character take hold of us. This process of empathetic reenactment of the character’s situation is what I call secondary imagining. As a result of putting myself, in imagination, in the character’s position, I come to have imaginary versions of the thoughts, feelings and attitudes I would have in that situation. (Currie 1995. p.153.) 

Well before Walton and Currie, Richard Wollheim made use of the idea of imagining from the inside to describe the process of identification (Wollheim 1974, 1984, 1987). Wollheim himself makes the explicit claim that “the person centrally imagined – if there is such a person – is imagined from the inside” (Wollheim 1974. p. 187. Original emphasis).​[9]​ What he means by central imagining is the following: 

When I visually imagine, or visualize, an event, there are two modes of doing so. I can imagine the event from no one’s standpoint: it unfolds frieze-like, across a divide. Or I can imagine it from the standpoint of one of the participants in the event, whom I then imagine from the inside. This latter mode I call centrally imagining. (Wollheim 1987. p. 103.)


Following Wollheim, I will use the term 'central imagining' and 'imagining from the inside' interchangeably. But what does imagining from the inside or central imagining mean? At first approximation, imagining from the inside is imagining having the experiences of another person. Kendall Walton analyzes the concept of ‘imagining from the inside’ at length in his book Mimesis as Make-Believe. He writes: 

Imagining from the inside is […] a form of self-imagining characteristically described as imagining doing or experiencing something (or being a certain way), as opposed to imagining merely that one does or experiences something or possess a certain property. (Walton 1990. p. 29.)

In other words, when I imagine A from the inside, then I imagine having the (perceptual) experience of A. Gregory Currie also expresses a similar idea: in the case of secondary imagining, “what we are primarily to imagine is the experience of a character” (Currie 1995. p. 153.).​[10]​ 
To sum up, imagining from the inside (or, central imagining, or secondary imagination) means that one imagines having the experiences of another agent. In other words, in such cases, I imagine having the same, or similar, experiences the other person is having. This aspect of the ‘imagining from the inside’ is quite problematic. First, it is not clear to what extent these experiences are supposed to be similar. Second, as I argued elsewhere, some clear cases of identification (or character engagement) do not follow this scheme. Some clarification and/or modification of the imagining from the inside view is needed.  
My suggestion is that central imagining (and therefore, identification) should be conceived along the lines of the account of theatre-perception I outlined in the last section. Acentral imagining would correspond to detached perception, whereby we do not see the possibility of any action in the stimulus. We imagine a situation centrally, however, if we see (or imagine) the situation as affording a certain action for someone on stage. 
I need to say a few words about acentral imagining as well. As we have seen, acentral imagining means that the spectator does not identify with any of the characters in the play. In the light of the upshot of this section, this would be equivalent to saying that the spectator does not see anything (or anyone) on stage as affording actions for one of the characters. Arguably, seeing the space of the performance as not affording actions for any of the characters in a performance is very rare when there is someone (not even necessarily a human being, as the puppet show example shows) on stage. 
This, however, does not mean that acentral imagining (which would be the equivalent of detached perception) is not possible in the theatre. Furthermore, some performances use a lot of scenes where nothing we see affords any action for anyone. The slow scenes of the theatre performances of Robert Wilson or some moments of Strehler’s productions might be good examples of this. 
In fact, directors can be characterized very well based on how they apply and try to trigger central and acentral imagining. Puppet shows and slapstick scenes would be the most obvious cases of central imagining whereby the scene affords very simple very easily recognizable motor actions. Grotowski and Peter Brook would be the two prime examples of the very complex and subtle application of central imagining, whereas Tadeusz Kantor, Bergman or Robert Wilson would present the audience with situations and characters where it would be difficult to see anything or anyone on stage as a possible object of an action. 
What I would like to suggest with this name-dropping is that the difference between central and acentral imagining does not mean quality difference of any kind: acentral imagining is not less specific to theatre than central imagining. What makes the reception of theatre performances interesting is precisely the interplay between these two kinds of attitude towards what is happening on stage. 
We have seen that everyday perception is a diverse phenomenon: sometimes it is detached, sometimes it is action-oriented. In order to account for perception in general both of these forms of perception have to be taken into consideration. 




If the argument presented above is correct, then theatre-perception cannot be analyzed without taking into consideration the connection between perception and action. The most significant difference in comparison with everyday perception is not that theatre-perception is detached from action, but that my perception is connected to someone else’s action: I see the objects (and sometimes the other characters as well) on stage as affording actions for someone else. 
The outline of the approach of theatre-perception in this paper does not aim to provide a general theory for describing every aspect of the audience’s experience in the theatre. The crucial question, for example, as to which character we are identifying with is not addressed. We see the space of the performance as affording certain actions to one of the characters, but what decides who this character will be? In the Brecht scene with Mack and Lucy, do I see the situation as affording a certain action for Mack or for Lucy? Is it possible that I identify with one character at the beginning of a scene, and with another at the end? What exactly triggers identification with a character? In order to settle these questions, probably higher order cognitive processes have to be taken to consideration. 
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^8	  Smith 1997. p. 412. 
^9	  Wollheim used the term ‘imagining from the inside’ years before Walton wrote anything about the topic. Also, he warns against possible misinterpretations of equating central imagining and imagining from the inside right after having made this claim: “I could not trust that phrase [the phrase ‘imagining from the inside’] so abused in philosophy” (Wollheim 1974. p. 87.). 
^10	  It has to be noted that according to Currie, the fact that “what we are primary to imagine is the experience of a character” is not sufficient for identification. He writes: “Further, identification, if it is a notion with any content at all, would seem to require the one who identifies to have, or to imagine having, some concern with or sympathy for the values and projects of the one with whom she identifies.” (Currie 1995. p. 175.) 
